ADMINISTRATION UPON ESTATES OF PERSONS
PRESUMED TO BE DEAD.
One of the curious subjects associated with the law of decedents' estates is the administration and distribution of estates of
supposed decedents. It is almost axiomatic to say that no letters
testamentary or letters of administration can be lawfully granted
on anyone's estate unless he or she is dead, and the fact of death
lawfully ascertained. The general rule is stated to be as follows:
The power of the court to grant letters of administration
exists only when the person whose estate is sought to be administered is dead, and if he is not dead, the authorities are almost
or probate
unanimous in holding that a grant of administration
1
of a will, and all proceedings thereunder, are void.
The fact of death is generally so notorious that no difficulty
attends the proof of it, but if, as occasionally happens, no direct
evidence can be had, it may be proved circumstantially by evidence
of a long-continued absence or other relevant circumstances like
any other fact; or a presumption of death may be created. In
other words, it is sometimes necessary to collect, protect and distribute property of a person who is probably dead in fact, but of
whose death no direct evidence can be produced before the proper
official, so as to secure the grant of letters testamentary or of administration on the estate in the usual way; and therefore the
death is proved either circumstantially, or by raising a legal presumption of death.
2
In such a case, to quote the words of Chief Justice Gibson,
"Not only convenience but necessity calls for a definite
rule to produce certainty of results in the determination of facts
which must be passed upon without proof; and such can be obtained only from the doctrine of presumptions, which, however
arbitrary, is indispensable, and, when founded in the ordinary
course of events, productive of results which usually accord with
the truth."
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At common law this doctrine was illustrated by the presumption that where a person is once shown to have been living, the
law will in general presume that he is still alive. 3 Originally this
presumption of continuance in life only ceased after a lapse of
time considerably exceeding the ordinary duration of human life ;4
that is to say, the legal presumption that the person continued to
live, was overcome by the fact that if living, he would be then
much older than human beings ordinarily live to be; and the
legal presumption of life then gave way to a stronger presumption, or conclusion, of fact, to the contrary.5
After a time, however, the English courts adopted the arbitrary period of seven years as the time, after which, if the person
in question had been continuously absent and not heard of, without apparent reason, the presumption of his death will thereupon
arise to rebut and replace the previous presumption of his continuance in life. This action of the court was based on the
Statute of I. James I. c. i i,6 which created a similar presumption
T
in certain specified cases, such as prosecutions for bigamy.
It follows logically, and the courts of many jurisdictions have
decided, that letters of administration on the estate of a supposed
decedent may be granted on such a presumption of death from
unexplained absence; though the administration may be afterwards overturned by proof that the party was actually alive at
the time of the grant.8 The jurisdictions in which such admin'Taylor on Evidence, Vol. I, §198; Chamberlayne on Evidence, Vol. II,
§1042; Burr v. Sim, supra.

'Chamberlayne on Evidence, Vol. II, §§Io42, logo.
'Holland v. Vance, 114 S. W. Rep. 346 (Tex. i9o8); Staffenback v.
Mather, 133 N. Y. S. 482 (19II).
1§2, and ig Car. II, c. 6.
'Chamberlayne on Evidence, Vol. II, §io93; Bacon's Abridgment, p. 622.
This legal presumption based on seven years' absence has been generally
adopted in the United States.
'Administration based on the presumption of death has been granted in
many jurisdictions in England and the United States, as is illustrated by the
following cases: Goods of Johnson, 78 L. T. N. S. 85 (Eng. 1898) ; Whiting
v. Nicholl, 46 Il. 230 (1867) ; Lancaster v. Washington L. Ins. Co., 62 Mo.
121 (1876) ; Morrison's Estate, 183 Pa. 155 (1897); In Matter of Sanford,
ioo N. Y. App. Div. 479 (19o5) ; Ferrell v. Grigsby, 51 S. W. Rep. 114 (Tenn.
1899); Wis. Trust Co. v. Wis. M. & F. Ins. Co. Bank, 105 Wis. 464 (19oo).
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istration has been granted have generally possessed no statute on
the subject, and therefore the proceedings were based on the common law presumption of death after an unexplained absence of
seven years, or longer period, or on proof that on a certain date
the supposed decedent was exposed to a specific peril, since which
date, and for a considerable time, he has not been heard of.
Among the States in which there are statutes applying to the
subject may be mentioned the following: Pennsylvania, 9 Indiana, 10 Louisiana" and Missouri.' 2 The Indiana statute applies only
to the settlement and distribution of estates of supposed decedents,
and for that purpose only creates a presumption of death in case of
the continued unexplained absence of a person for five years. The
Missouri statute directs that the presumption of death shall arise
from an unexplained absence from the State of Missouri, lasting
seven years; the absence from the State must in every case be
affirmatively proved before the presumption will arise. 1 3 In all
such cases, whether based on the common law presumption, or
on a statute, the absence for the prescribed period must be continuous, the absentee must not have communicated during that
period with any of the persons who would naturally hear of or
from him, if he were alive; and his absence and silence must be
unexplained except upon the assumption that he is dead. As was
said in Fuller v. New York Life Insurance Company,' 4 by McPherson, J.:
"The stress is to be put on the word 'unexplained.' This
has become the important question, and is always a question
of fact."
The most complete system of settling the estates of such persons is found in Pennsylvania. The Act of I885,'" provides,
that upon application made to the Register of Wills for letters of
administration upon the estate of any person supposed to be dead
on account of absence for seven or more years from the place of
his last domicile within the State, the register shall cer'Act of June 24, 1885, Pamphlet Laws I55; Act of April 14, I9O5, Pamphlet Laws 153.
" Burn's Ann. St. 19o8, §§ 2747-2748.
u Civil Code, T. S.

" Rev. Stat. I9O9, §6340.
" Bradley v. Mod. Woodm. of Am.,
'9. Fed. Rep. 897 (1912).
"Supra, note 9.
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S. W. Rep. 69 (1910).
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tify the application to the Orphans' Court, and this court, if
satisfied that the applicant would be entitled to administration
if the absentee were in fact dead, shall cause the fact of the application to be advertised in a newspaper published in the county
once a week for four successive weeks, giving notice that on a
day stated, which must be two weeks after the last publication,
evidence will be heard by the court concerning the alleged
absence of the supposed decedent, and the circumstances and duration thereof.
The procedure under this Act is by a petition to the register
of the county of the last-known principal residence of the absentee, within the State; which shall set forth, in addition to the
usual facts necessary to show the jurisdiction of the register in
granting letters of administration, the fact that the supposed
decedent has been absent and not heard of for at least seven years
continuously, immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
that he was last known to reside in the county in which the petition is presented; that no administrator has been appointed for
his estate; and concluding with the prayer for the grant of letters
of administration to the petitioner.
It is then the duty of the register to certify this application
to the Orphans' Court of the same county, and if the court finds
the petition to be in proper form, it is referred to an examiner to
take the testimony of witnesses concerning the alleged absence
of the supposed decedent, and the circumstances and duration
thereof. After the appointment of the examiner, he proceeds as
in other cases of reference to an examiner, with this addition,
that, before holding a meeting for the purposes of his appointnient, he should advertise a notice of the date of the meeting
once a week for four weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
as well as the legal periodical, if any, published in the county, the
last advertisement to be at least two weeks before the date fixed
for the meeting.
At the meeting before the examiner, the petitioner must
produce evidence in support of the averments of his petition; the
examiner then files his report of his proceedings, and attaches
thereto the testimony taken before him, and proof of publication
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of the notice of his meeting. If in the opinion of the court the
evidence proves prima facie the facts stated in the petition, and
makes out the legal presumption of death of the absentee, the
court enters a decree that the legal presumption of death is established; and orders further that notice of this decree shall be published for two successive weeks in a daily newspaper and in the
legal publication (if any) published in the county. These notices
require the supposed decedent, if alive, or any other person for
him, to produce to the court, on or before a certain date, which
shall be twelve weeks from the last publication of said notice,
satisfactory evidence of his continuance in life. The decree as
well as the notice published shall state further that upon failure to
produce such evidence to the court, a decree will be entered at
the expiration of the period named in the decree, directing the
Register of Wills of the proper county to issue letters of administration to the petitioner. If no evidence is produced to the
court that the supposed decedent is alive, the court at the expiration of twelve weeks after the last publication, makes a decree
directing the register to issue the letters of administration as
prayed for; and in accordance therewith, the register will then
grant the letters to the petitioner.
By the supplementary Act of 1905,16 above referred to, if the
supposed decedent left a will, the initial procedure is the same as
that in cases of intestacy. The person entitled to administer the
estate must first procure the issuing of letters of administration
under the Act of 1885; then the person having possession of the
will should produce it before the register and file a petition for
its probate, upon which a citation is issued to the persons who
would be entitled to the estate if there were no will, and to the
administrator so already appointed, directing them to show cause
why the will should not be probated. If no cause is then shown,
and the will is properly proved according to law, it is admitted to
probate and a certified copy of it is attached to the letters of
administration, making them in effect letters of administration
cirn testainento anne.xo; or, if the will names an executor, the
previous letters of administration are revoked and letters of
" Supra, note 9.
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administration issued to the executor. These last-named letters
are really letters testamentary, although called letters of administration.
The Act of 1885 was attacked in Cunnius v. School District.1 7 This case involved the curious situation of a woman hav-

ing dower rights in a certain piece of land on which a schoolhouse
was built, who moved to the State of California and remained
there for eleven years without being heard from by those in her
home locality. During the interval, letters of administration were
granted upon her estate under the Act of i885, and the arrears
of dower up to that date were paid to her administrator. Then
at the end of this period she brought suit in the court of her
former domicile in Pennsylvania to recover her dower, and at
the trial of her suit, ample evidence was produced that she was
still living. Whereupon the Berks County Court held that the
Act was unconstitutional and void, and that she was entitled to
the arrears of her dower. On appeal from this decision it was
affirmed by the Superior Court, but on a further appeal the Supreme Court of the State reversed the decision, held the Act to
be constitutional, and this decision was finally affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 8
This procedure gives rise to a number of puzzling questions.
For instance, what is the effect of a payment by the administrator in such case to a creditor, or to the administrator, by a debtor,
when the supposed decedent afterwards proves to be alive? Some
authorities hold that the administratorN in the first instance, is
Pa. 469 (19o3).
is198 U. S. 458 (1904), "Which finally and judicially doomed het to death
for the rest of her life." (Drawing Wills and Settlement of Estates, by Hon.
John Marshall Gest, p. 8o.) She asserted that the proceedings in the state
court and the receipt of the administrator furnished no protection to the
school district, because, as she was alive when the proceedings for administration were taken in the state court, those proceedings and the law which
authorized them were repugnant to the XIV Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The principal authority she relied on in support of her contention
was the case of Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (I894), which was strongly
in her favor, but arose in the State of Washington in which there was no
statute on the subject of granting administration on a presumption of death
arising from long absence. The Supreme Court held that the subject was
within the police power of a state, and could be regulated by the statute;
and therefore the Pennsylvania Act was constitutional and protected the
defendant in making its payment to the administrator.
1T2o6
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then subrogated to the rights of the creditors whose claims he
has paid, and therefore he would be entitled to credits for whatever amounts he had lawfully paid them, so far as they themselves
could enforce payment; which gives him some measure of protection.1 9
The Act of 1885 20 directs that
"The said letters, until revoked, and all acts done in pursuance thereof and in reliance thereupon, shall be as valid as if
the supposed decedent were really dead."
The next Section provides that
"The Orphans' Court may revoke the said letters at any
time on due and satisfactory proof that the supposed decedent
is in fact alive; after which revocation all the powers of the
administrator shall cease, but all receipts or disbursements of
assets, and other acts previously done by him, shall remain as
valid, as if the said letters were unrevoked ;"
Thereupon the administrator shall settle his account and
transfer all assets remaining to the supposed decedent; less the
costs of issuing the letters and of revoking them, which shall
be first deducted and paid: (Section 7); and it is further provided that the supposed decedent may recover all of his property
distributed to those who would have been his widow, heir or next
to kin, if he had been dead. As further security for the supposed
decedent, the distributees of his estate are required to give sufficient security, approved of by the court, for the return of the
amounts received by each of them on demand, with interest, to
the supposed decedent, if he is in fact at the time alive; and upon
their failing to give such security, the money shall be put at interest and the interest paid annually to the person entitled to it, until
the security aforesaid is given, or the court shall order it to be
paid to the persons entitled to it.
Accordingly, Cunnius v. School District,2 1 holds that the
payment made to an administrator or executor appointed under
the Act or its supplement is a satisfaction of the debt and exposes
"Beam v. Copeland, 54 Ark. 70 (i8go).
'

§4.
Supra, note if.
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the debtor to no further liability in case the supposed decedent is
in fact alive. The latter has only the remedy of securing from his
administrator any assets remaining in his hands undistributed;
and of recovering from the distributees whatever has been paid
to them in the capacity of widow, heirs, next of kin or legatees,
and his rights in this respect are fully secured by the refunding
bonds required by the Act or by the investment of the assets in
case such bonds are not given. It seems to follow also that all
payments by the administrator to creditors of the supposed decedent are equally valid, if the latter is in fact alive.
Another doubtful question that may arise under this Statute
is as to the final disposition of this fund, supposing it to be invested as required by the Act on account of failure of the distributees to give refunding bonds. How long then will the Orphans' Court require the fund to remain invested and postpone
its payment to the widow, heirs, next of kin or legatees? We
presume such payment would be authorized by the court, either
upon proof afterwards made that the supposed decedent was in
fact dead either at the time letters were granted on his estate, or
subsequently; or when such additional period of years elapsed as
according to the old common law rule already mentioned would
exceed the probable period of human life, so as to convert the presumption of the person's death into an incontrovertible fact. It
is possible, however, that in the meantime a great hardship might
result to the persons presumptively entitled to the estate; and it
would have been well to provide in the Act more particularly for
the final distribution in such cases.
The Act of 1905 22 provides that upon compliance with its
terms all property of the "decedent" shall be vested as provided
by his will; and all acts done thereunder shall be valid, even
if the letters are afterwards revoked upon proof of the supposed
decedent being in fact alive; but makes no provision for requiring
refunding bonds from the legatees, so that protection to the absentee testator is lacking.
The importance of regulating this subject by statute instead
of trusting to common law principles as is done in most jurisdic"Supra, note 9.
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tions, is shown by the case of Scott v. McNeal,23 holding that in
any such case the letters of administration are void if the supposed decedent is in fact alive at the time they are granted; no
matter how long afterwards the fact of his existence becomes
known and no matter what has been done with his estate in the
meantime. The unfortunate and sometimes unjust results that
might follow from this decision caused the court to reach the
24
different conclusion embodied in Cunnius v. School District,
but an examination of that decision shows that it is expressly limited to cases arising under state statutes, and in all other cases
the decision of Scott v. McNeal remains a binding authority.
In such cases, not regulated by statute, the grant of administration is void not only against the supposed decedent himself
but as to all others besides who may choose to question it. It
is not a case of a judgment by a court having apparent jurisdiction, which therefore cannot be set aside collaterally; but upon
showing the fact of the supposed decedent being alive at the time
the court assumed jurisdiction over his estate, the foundation of
its jurisdiction is removed and its decision left open to collateral
attack. The hardships that may follow from leaving the subject to be governed solely by common law principles may be
serious, although not of frequent occurrence. The supposed
decedent may return after an absence brought about by no fault
of his own, and find a large estate dissipated by persons who are
not financially able to make good his loss; or the debtors who
have paid their claims to his administrator or executor may be
compelled, at great hardship to themselves, to pay them a second time to the creditor, upon his appearing and proving his
identity and claiming the money which they owe him. Lastly,
the persons to whom his estate may have been distributed under
the forms of law, and who have received it in good faith, believing in his death, may be caused great hardship if they have
used the money or other property, by being called on to restore
it to the sulposedly defunct owner.
Therefore a statutory system of regulation similar to that
28 154

U. S. 34 (894).
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embodied in the Pennsylvania statutes above mentioned, is desirable, not only to protect the property of the supposed decedent
during his absence and secure its return to him as far as possible
upon his appearing to be alive; but also for the protection of innocent creditors, debtors, and heirs and next of kin of the supposed decedent. The risk which the absentee runs, of being deprived of his property without his consent by proceedings under
such a statute, is usually caused by his own voluntary act and
therefore he has little cause to complain of the result; while in
the absence of any statute the law which secures him the return
of his property will often do so at a loss to debtors or others who
had nothing to do with causing his absence and no reason to
believe him to be alive at the time when his death was legally
presumed and his estate administered.
Meredith Hanna.
Philadelphia.

